Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to disseminate the results of an interdisciplinary experiment in which social network analysis methodologies are applied to a historical case study. It visualizes the network and then measures the relationships between its actors while mitigating the source-centricity problem often found in historical network analysis. In this way, historians can better understand the dynamics of a network under analysis.
This paper first outlines the major themes in the related literature on networks in history and places our contribution in context. It then outlines the eighteenth-century case study and methodology for its analysis. This is followed by the quantitative analysis and a discussion of its results. Finally, we make our conclusions.
Historians and Networks
Historians have been using networks as an analytical tool for some time. When historians discuss networks, they usually mean networks of people. However, networks may also describe patterns of distribution, credit, or information. In this paper we discuss people, and in particular, a "pattern of relationships" or the "connectedness between either individuals or organizations."
2 As Paul Duguid has recently pointed out, the increasing discussion on networks in history seems to imply that there is something new about them. 3 This is clearly not so. Eighteenth-century merchants were well aware of the usefulness and agency of their networks, even if they used the term "association," rather than network. 4 These networks, or associations, are often ascribed positive attributes by historians; that is, they are interpreted as being inherently good both for the economy and the actors within it. Quaker networks are the epitome of this approach, even if they are somewhat unrepresentative. 5 Their constant monitoring of one another produced a reputation for good business practice, which spread outside their own community. However, while there is no doubt that the Quakers provide us with an example of good business practice, such behavior was not confined to their community. This ascribed or characteristic-based trust can also be seen in non-Quaker networks. 6 Anyone of the same religion or sect, such as Anglican, Jewish, Catholic, or Unitarian, for example, might be considered as more trustworthy by those within that group. Ethnicity and nationality could be another reason for entry into a network, such as the Scots in the Caribbean. 7 The most obvious ascribed trust was that between family members. Peter Mathias has highlighted the importance of the "kinship nexus," especially for business start up in a low-institutional environment.
8 Indeed, such networks should be able to provide emotional support as well as capital and training.
9
They should also work to reduce information and transaction costs and to avoid the costs of vertical integration. We can see this in the eighteenth-century Atlantic in terms of merchants purchasing sugar through their networks of factors in the West Indies, rather than purchasing their own plantations.
10
There is therefore a sense that networks are essentially benign, but this is not necessarily true. Linda Renzulli et al. have described how kinship ties can be restrictive because they do not open up new opportunities and contacts.
11 Charles Tilly has also shown that networks based on ethnicity can encourage members to be inward looking when other contacts available through weak ties may have provided better opportunities. 12 Nor were family members always reliable. Francis Bright, the Jamaica factor for the Bright-Meyler dynasty in Bristol, was often ill and apparently spent more time drinking and womanizing than attending to business, and Jeremiah Meyler invested money in various hair-brained schemes against the instructions of the Bristol house. 13 Being the brother or nephew of a successful merchant did not magically endow that person with the same skills and so obligations to members of the ethnic or religious group could also prove troublesome and expensive. For example, in Philadelphia, Quaker widows
6. An ascribed or characteristic-based trust is one that is placed in someone because of certain attributes or characteristics ascribed to them. Zucker, "Production of Trust," 53. were often given longer to pay for their goods and advanced capital in order to start up a business. 14 More recently, historians have recognized that eighteenth-century networks were more "modern." Richardson and Pearson found that in Liverpool, iterative business activity led to relationships that were predominantly based around trade rather than ethnicity or religion.
15
Trevor Burnard also found that elite groups in Maryland did not have to be based on marriage ties. 16 Iterative business activity could lead to "relational cohesion," or a good feeling based on past experience.
17
In this way, by taking small risks at first, and by using recommendations based on reputation, networks could be expanded. Indeed, David Hancock has shown how merchants came together in order to share skills, knowledge, and capital and that many networks included people who had never met. 18 This is not to say that such networks were always reliable either. Networks based on trade-based relationships could also produce obligations that tied people to incompetent, belligerent, or dishonest people. Being associated with such people could have long-term effects not only on them but their associates; "network memory" could be long lasting. 19 Indeed, Forbes and Munro found that some businessmen positively avoided long-term connections because they found that they restricted business opportunity and flexibility. 20 Historians have also recognized that these networks provide social and human capital that could potentially benefit all the actors. 21 However, Portes has also pointed out that we need to be aware of the negative effects of social capital.
22
We should not overplay problems with networks in the eighteenth century. What is truly amazing is that the sense of obligation within the trading community, based on cultural embeddedness, produced an environment in which there was generally a lack of abuse of networks.
23 This is despite the fact that the distances involved in trans-Atlantic trade created an environment in which principalagency problems could easily occur and in which moral hazard was historians have yet to do is to measure the relationships within these networks to be able to assess who had the most connections, who was contacted the most, who represented chokepoints of information, and who had the best access to information; that is, the relationships between the actors that are the defining feature of a network. Therefore, this paper adopts visual analytics and graph theory that enable us to measure the relationships between actors in a network, thereby contributing in a novel way to the historiography problematizing the functionality of eighteenth-century networks.
Background to the Case Study and Methodology
Samuel Rainford was a merchant based in Kingston, Jamaica, between 1774 and 1798. He emigrated from Liverpool and maintained business and personal contacts there throughout his time in Jamaica. He worked as an independent merchant, at his own risk and profit, and also as a factor, or agent, for merchants back in Liverpool. This meant that while he ran a business at his own risk, hopefully for higher profit, he also worked on commission for others. 25 This type of dualrole long-distance principal-agent relationship was normal during this period. 26 Sometimes family members were used to perform this agency function in the British West Indies and elsewhere, but as noted above family members were not always reliable, and often a suitable person known to at least some of the principal actors in the network was used, as was the case here. 27 Samuel Rainford had made a good choice in going to Jamaica. While Liverpool was the leading British slave trade port at this time, Jamaica was the leading entrepôt for slaves in the West Indies. At the height of his business during this period, Rainford's merchant house dealt with a significant percentage of the slave sales in Kingston from Liverpool. used as the agent in Jamaica to sell approximately thirteen thousand slaves to over three hundred and fifty customers.
29
Rainford also exported sugar and other goods from Kingston to Liverpool and imported various manufactures in return for the almost monocultural economy. This mixing of various trades was a riskreduction strategy employed by most merchants in Jamaica.
30 They were also vital in providing goods and credit facilities to the planters in the island. Rainford is therefore a representative case study because the trades in which he was involved, the slave trade, sugar trade, and importation of merchandise and groceries into Kingston, Jamaica, link him with some of the major ports and players of British-Atlantic trade at this time. The quantitative data provided by a ledger of the firm forms the basis for the experimental part of this paper in which we apply graph theory to Rainford's network. His ledger is correlated with a widely available quantitative data set that has been used to furnish further details on the slave trade networks of the voyages in which Rainford was involved. 31 We have also used secondary literature to provide context for the analysis. In the discussion of methodological issues in the section "Methodological Issues," we have used qualitative data related to the case study to comment on the reliability and completeness of the results.
32
As historians, we often place our case study at center stage, giving them a centrality they do not always warrant, and by implication, an importance they do not deserve. This source centrality of course skews our view of the data we analyze. This skewing also occurs if we try to measure those relationships. The source will inevitably be placed in the center of the network and the analyst will invariably analyze the network from this point of view. Therefore, rather than analyze the networks centered on Rainford, we identify and analyze the networks to which he had access. This mitigates the problem of source centrality.
The visualizations presented within this paper represent both direct and indirect relationships identified within Rainford's ledger and the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database. A direct relationship is taken to be the ships' captains with whom Rainford would have had direct access and the merchants with whom Rainford had direct access to by letter in Liverpool, the ship's "husband" or manager for the voyage. We have had to assume that owner A, the first listed in the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, is that person. The other owners are taken to be investors only with no direct contact with Rainford. These are therefore treated as indirect relationships.
Adopting visualization techniques and graph theory allows us to take tangible evidence (the actors in the network we can see in the ledgers and letters etc.) and measure the intangible evidence (the relationships between those actors). Visualizing Rainford's network of over ninety actors is useful in itself to demonstrate the connections therein, but as demonstrated by our quantitative analysis, measuring the relationships really gives us a profoundly different insight into them. The measures we use here have been chosen to demonstrate different characteristics within those relationships, though we do not suggest that any of these alone is the "correct" measure. 33 We will use four measures, which are out-degree centrality, indegree centrality, betweeness centrality, and closeness centrality. Together, these measures allow us to make judgments about the relationships between the actors in Rainford's network. The measures are described briefly in the next section; for a more technical and full explanation of the measures, see Appendix A.
Analysis of Rainford's Slave Trade Network
Rainford, as discussed above, was a significant actor in the LiverpoolJamaica slave trade, and figure 1 highlights the fact that he was part of 33. All measures used in this section are those detailed by Wasserman & Faust, 1994 However, in order to combat the problems of source centrality, we removed Rainford from the network so that we could measure the networks to which he had access (see methodology above). Figure 2 represents those networks, which consist of ship's captains, ship's husbands, and other investors in slave trade shipping. With the exception of the Henry Blundell and Richard Miles subnets, all of these were either in Liverpool or worked out of Liverpool.
It is immediately obvious that Rainford had access to a large number of sub-nets, of various sizes, some of which were connected, and some of which worked in isolation. The latter included sub-nets such as the Blundell, Waddington, Mason, and the Houghton, Webster, Cotter group. These smaller groups meant that fewer actors came together to share capital, risk, and information. This may have been through personal choice, or through a lack of access to networks, whether through strong or weak ties. 35 In contrast, there are many subnets with larger investment groups and good ties with other networks. These include William Boats (middle left) and the large interconnected investment groups based around Richard Wicksted, Thomas Hodgson, Thomas Earle, Benjamin Heywood, and Thomas Rumbold (on the right). It is worth noting briefly that the last four names are instantly recognizable as being from elite Liverpool trading families (more on these later). We can see that while the smaller sub-nets consist of only three people, most of the sub-nets are far larger. This is because the slave trade was known to be far riskier than other Atlantic trades. It also required a higher level of capitalization, skills, and organization. 36 It is therefore not surprising to find large investment groups in Liverpool, and indeed ones that were often highly interconnected. Indeed, by the period covered in this paper, Liverpool was known to have built up significant human capital with regard to its merchants' ability to pursue the trade successfully. One way in which this was secured was through the promotion of slave trade captains into the ranks of merchants. 37 This was certainly the case with William Boats. Merchants also progressed from being secondary and perhaps smaller investors, into being larger investors and ship's husbands, and this occurred in the case of Thomas Hodgson. This allowed skills and knowledge to be passed through the network, and 36. Haggerty, "Risk and Risk Management." 37. Behrendt, "Human Capital." Figure 3 Out-degree centrality of investment networks to which Rainford had access.
facilitated a growth in trust based on relational cohesion following iterative trading.
38
The fact that most people needed access to capital, skills, and information means that it is important to understand the networks to which Rainford had access. Figure 3 illustrates the out-degree centrality within the network. That is, the relative number of contacts any particular actor within the network possesses-the expansiveness of his or her ties. This measure tells us who was the best connected.
The actor with the most ties in the network is William Boats, followed by John Gregson, Thomas Earle, and then Benjamin Heywood. However, the visualization identifies a key difference in the business relationships that these actors utilized and ultimately their business operations. William Boats worked either independently, or in partnership with only two other investors, Thomas Seaman and James Percival between 1782 and 1793. Mostly, he was the lead investor. During the period 1788-1790, Seaman acted as the principal investor 38. Lawler & Yoon, "Commitment in Exchange Relations." before Boats again took on this role from 1790-1793. Boats did not therefore fit the general pattern of investors. By taking in fewer investors, he was maximizing his risks, but potentially also his profits. Boats' extensive ties were mostly amongst the ships' captains. This is a reflection of the fact that he used a group of fewer investors, and also that he was involved in many voyages that involved Rainford using many different captains, because he invested in several voyages per year. Another reason for the importance of Boats within this network is that from 1787 the Boats, Seaman, Percival investment group were (with one exception) the only merchants to send slaves care of Rainford in Kingston.
The other actors with the highest out-degree centrality were Benjamin Heywood, John Gregson, and Thomas Earle. John Gregson organized one voyage independently and the other with an extensive number of investors, including three members of his family. Thomas Earle and Benjamin Heywood both used an extensive number of other investors in the voyages that they organized. In the case of Earle and Heywood, this involved each other as well as Thomas Parke and William Earle junior in overlapping sub-nets. Therefore, these traders appear to have wanted to share the risk of the slave adventure amongst others within the Liverpool business community. It may also be that they had access to better networks than William Boats, although it is worth noting that all of them, including Boats, were involved in the same Liverpool cultural institutions in the late eighteenth century.
39
There could also be other factors involved here such as reputation, personality, and kinship ties. Certainly, the Earles and the Heywoods were major families within the Liverpool business community. Boats was notoriously an orphan-allegedly named after the vessel in which he was found.
40
In-degree centrality is the opposite of out-centrality in that it identifies the relative number of people who contact or use a particular actor-his "prestige" or "popularity" within the network. This allows us to see which actors are perceived as having a good reputation or the social capital that makes them a desirable contact. In this case, those actors with the necessary trust, reputation, and ability to organize a successful slave trade voyage. Figure 4 illustrates the in-degree centrality within the trade networks. Boats is again identified as the most central to Rainford's network and this was due to his connections with ships' captains and the many voyages for which he used Rainford as a factor in the West Indies. In addition, Seaman, Boats' partner, is also identified as central, as he was part of the same small investor group. Note that the third actor in the small subnet, Percival, is not ranked highly. This is because he was only an investor, and never a ship's husband on a voyage, and therefore has no direct contact with Rainford or the ships' captains conducting the voyages. The third most central actor is Thomas Hodgson. Due to his earlier investments with Wicksted and Earle, Hodgson was no doubt seen as someone with the ability to organize a successful voyage in his own right despite the fact that this voyage was over ten years later. Of course, he could have easily invested in the slave trade in other networks, building up trust and reputation independently of the Rainford networks. 41 In addition, a number of ships' captains, such as Thomas Rives, William Horsley, and Joseph Fayrer, were equally important as investors. This reflects the fact that they conducted more than one voyage and would have current knowledge of the trade. Furthermore, they would have had direct contact with Rainford while in Jamaica and so would have built up their relationship with him while in the British West Indies. Ships' captains were therefore important not only in terms of their skills and knowledge of the trade itself, but were often the only people to have regular contact with the factor in the West Indies.
Betweeness centrality identifies the relative ability of actors to facilitate the flow of information within a network. Those who act as chokepoints may be centers of power, control and influence. If an actor has control over information he can restrict it or share it to their benefit as he or she chooses. These actors may not only have control over the investors and ships' captains that they work with, but the decision of whether to use Rainford as their agent in Kingston. They would therefore be the key actors for Rainford to know and trade with during this period. Figure 5 illustrates betweeness centrality within the trade groups. Boats is again identified as a key actor with much control within the network. Benjamin Heywood and Thomas Earle are also identified as having a greater influence within the network due to their links with one another and their respective networks of investors. Of interest is ship's captain Joseph Fayrer, who is also identified as having relatively good betweeness centrality within the network, being far more important than some principal investors. Fayrer was incredibly well connected in the network because he worked for Thomas Rumbold, one of the early principal investors, but more importantly, because of his links to the Heywood subnet. His importance in this network may also be reinforced by the fact that he is one of the ships' captains that used their knowledge and profits as a captain to become an investor themselves, in this case in the Heywood subnet.
Finally, figure 6 visualizes Closeness Centrality, which identifies the relative access to information that actors possess-those closer to other actors in the network may be less reliant on a chain of others for their decision-making process and may also be more efficient. Those actors are likely to have access to the latest information and to be able to make well-judged decisions. In this case study, these actors will be able to control the terms of any business conducted.
The key actors in this measure were those that operated in very small networks; Richard Miles, John Shaw, Henry Blundell, and John Houghton. These actors had more independence as they were able to directly control their investments within the slave trade. At the next level of closeness centrality are the ships' captains that worked for these investors, John Mason, John Skinner, James Waddington, and John Cotter. Their centrality in this measure demonstrates their importance in the successful completion of slave trade investments, especially within a small network.
The key actor in the larger networks identified by the Rainford ledger is Thomas Hodgson. He was well connected with his own and other sub-networks, but had the ability to operate as an independent actor without being influenced by other important controlling actors identified above such as Thomas Earle and Benjamin Heywood. Other central actors, such as Thomas Twemlow and John Gregson, operated with their own investment networks and it would be their own decision to use Rainford as an agent. John Gregson worked with Rainford on more than one occasion during this period. William Rutson worked within a sub-net with John Backhouse, but using this analysis, it could be suggested that he was a more independent actor than Backhouse.
To summarize the quantitative analysis provided in this section, table 2 provides an overview of the main actors by centrality measure. It demonstrates that by using different quantitative measures of the network, the historian is provided with different viewpoints of the relationships between actors. We can see that Boats is central under most of the measures, but that other actors are also stressed depending on the measure used.
The quantitative analysis has provided results that identify the dynamics of the network that is not available from an analysis of the tangible evidence alone. First, it has provided a visualization and measurement of the Rainford slave trade network. This provides historians with a graphical representation of business records. Second, it identifies those merchant groups that were able to spread their risk at the expense of profits compared to those in a more risky position by being in smaller networks. It is possible that this second group were able to mitigate their risk by the choice of ships' captains who had current knowledge of the trade. Third, it identifies those actors that had greater levels of control over investments and information in the network at this time, both in terms of access to investment and choice of agent. Finally, through their access to investors or contacts, the key facilitators of slave trade voyages in Liverpool have been identified. 
Methodological Issues
The visualizations and analysis discussed in the preceding section provide the historian with a valuable tool in quantifying the unquantifiable and in measuring the dynamics of historical social networks based on even limited datasets. However, this experiment, while providing valuable quantitative analysis supported by the secondary literature, has identified a number of methodological issues. These issues, both positive and negative, should be taken into account in future case studies by historians using this approach. The key issues with the methodology are as follows.
Failure to identify key players in quantitative source analysis
The main problem with using finite material such as the quantitative data analyzed here is that it does not provide the whole story. The surrounding qualitative data (held in a separate archive) demonstrates that four key actors are absent in this analysis. The first is Rainford's friend and attorney in Liverpool; Edward Chaffers. Chaffers was Rainford's main contact in Liverpool throughout the period and was the reason Rainford first went to Jamaica. Importantly, he also acted as a mentor to Rainford's errant family in Liverpool. completely absent. The qualitative sources demonstrate that it was Blundell senior (the father of Jonathon Blundell junior) who first introduced Rainford into the slave trade network through his extensive contacts in Liverpool, especially Thomas Rumbold. 44 The reason that Blundell senior is absent here is that he withdrew from the slave trade during the American War of Independence. 45 He therefore does not show up in the quantitative sources even though he obviously was extremely important to Rainford's business through the extension of credit and recommendations. The qualitative data also demonstrate that Rainford and his brother had disagreements with Jonathon Blundell senior's firm, which eventually led to arbitration and the exit of Jonathon Blundell junior from the Kingston business. 46 There is also a link between the reliance on the Boats, Seaman, Percival investment group from 1788 onward and the increasing problems between Rainford and Blundell senior, although the causality is not clear. What is obvious is that once Blundell junior returned to Liverpool from Kingston in 1789, he had far better access to information, credit, and, importantly, gossip, than did the Rainford brothers in Kingston.
Source-centric data
The main source of the data used within the case study is Samuel Rainford's account ledger, which provides a snapshot of his network from his point of view. Therefore, we can only visualize the network from a source-centric viewpoint. Although this was partly allowed for by taking Rainford out of the measurements once the network was constructed, the network is still skewed. Thus, Rainford's contact is overrepresented and his role exaggerated. We have no access to the actors themselves to ask questions on the results as would be the case with a modern study, and correlation with other data sources is not necessarily available. Therefore, we are unable to assess other actors' centrality in Rainford's wider business dealings, the centrality of Rainford in the other actors' business networks or of Rainford's centrality in the wider slave trade networks of this period. This problem is not unique to the analysis of historical case studies. For example, in the study of contemporary social networks identified through computer forensics investigations, it is recognized that an analyst cannot solely rely on one source of data. 47 An investigation of social networks identified by computer data would correlate information from a variety of sources, such as email, mobile phone records, files resident on the computer, etc., to provide a full picture of the central actors' activities. In the examination of historical data, it is recognized that the historian rarely has multiple data sources with which to provide a correlation.
Reliability of results
As we are relying on a source-centric viewpoint, it leaves the question of reliability of the results. Rainford's centrality skews the figures so that certain actors will have small figures associated with them; yet "significant evidence is not evidence of significance." 48 The importance of Rainford is highlighted because the source is centered on him.
The way in which we addressed this in this experiment was to remove Rainford from the network before calculating our four measures. This mitigates the source-centric issue discussed above to enable the identification and analysis of key actors within the Liverpool slave trade community during this period.
Visualization
Using social network analysis and visual analytics has allowed for the visualization of a quite complicated network. Visual analytics facilitated not only the representation of the network (and subnets), but also the complicated and interrelated nature of them. This in itself is beneficial to historians working with complex networks and could easily be adapted to larger networks than the one analyzed here. The analysis of subnets has also demonstrated that while this dataset is source-centric, the relationships between other actors can easily be highlighted.
Measurement of relationships
The measurements provided here are, in some ways, problematic due to the source-centric nature of the data. However, key players in the 47. A computer forensics investigation will typically rely on evidence from a variety of sources. For example, a case would involve the collection and analysis of evidence from the suspect's hard drive, computer memory, storage media, network logs, cell phone, etc. For further details, see, for example, Richard III & Roussev, Li & Seberry, "Forensic Computing"; Haggerty and Taylor, "Managing Computer Forensics." 48. Milne, 6. 51. This technique has been used in computer forensics investigations where more data are available to identify influential nodes. Haggerty, Taylor, and Gresty, "Determining Culpability in E-mail investigations." community during this period and identified in the Rainford network would have been ignored using a frequency analysis. Thomas Earle and Thomas Rutson each appear twice by total investments but only once by principal investor. John Gregson appears twice, once as principal investor and once by total investments. Thomas Twemlow only appears once under each frequency. Importantly, using a traditional historical approach, such key figures as Arthur Heywood, Henry Blundell, and John and Thomas Tarleton appear only once and therefore would have been assessed as insignificant players in the Liverpool business community at this time, which is not the case.
This methodology also provides predictiveness in other ways; for example, in trying to determine actors' roles if they were not known. The case study has highlighted that using measures such as closeness centrality, ships' captains can be discerned from investors despite many of these actors having the same frequency as each other. Therefore, the predictiveness of this methodology and its advantages over more traditional techniques are significant contributions to the analysis of historical networks.
Conclusion
This paper has examined an eighteenth-century slave trade network identified through the ledger of Samuel Rainford, a merchant based in Kingston, Jamaica, with ties and access to Liverpool networks. The ledgers provide tangible evidence of Rainford's business activities between 1779 and 1793, and the resultant analysis provides intangible evidence regarding the dynamics and centrality within the network. Historians have started to problematize their networks, and this paper contributes to this more sophisticated analysis of business networks. There are some issues with this methodology such as source centrality and the omission of key actors. Conversely, this methodology highlights important actors that would otherwise have been thought insignificant and has predictive qualities. Most importantly, this methodology allows us the measure the intangible relationships in Rainford's networks and distinguish them from the tangible (the source data).
Appendix A: Full Description of the Measures Used
Four measures of centrality are identified as useful in providing an analysis of the network dynamics within our case study. It is not the focus of this analysis to suggest which is the most "correct" measure of a graph. However, a combination of various measures provides an overview of the dynamics of the network from different viewpoints and an appreciation of the actors' roles therein. The measures of the network are as follows.
Out-degree centrality. 52 This measure analyses the expansiveness, or number of actors that a particular actor possesses or accesses. Outdegree centrality in this study uses the actor out-degree centralization (AODC) measure. An AODC value of zero indicates that all actors within the group are equal, as would occur in a regular lattice. An AODC value of one indicates that a single actor dominates all other actors within the network.
In-degree centrality. This network measure is used in social network analysis to identify the receptivity or "popularity" of a given actor. That is, how many people want to access him or her as a network entity. This measure identifies those actors that are seen as key facilitators for other actors within the network. An actor in-degree centralization (AIDC) value of zero again indicates that all actors within the group are equal, as would occur in a regular lattice. An AIDC value of one indicates that all actors are linked to a single actor.
Betweeness centrality. This network measure identifies potential points of control within the trade network. Betweeness recognizes that communication flow within a given network often does not rely solely on adjacent actors, but takes place along geodesics. Due to being focal points of communications within the group and subgroups, certain actors facilitate contact and communications within the network and can therefore be seen as major channels of influence. These actors form chokepoints for information sharing within the network. An actor betweeness centralization (ABC) value falls between zero, indicating that all actors have exactly the same betweeness within the network, and one, when a single actor falls on all geodesics between all the other (i.e., n -1) actors (indicative of a star network). To calculate the ABC value, ABC(u) is calculated using the sum of (s, t, u) , where the sum of (s, t, u) is the number of geodesics from s to t through u. Thus, (s, t, u) is the ratio of all geodesics between s and t, which run through u and ABC(u), reflecting how often the actor u lies on the geodesics between the other actors of the network.
Closeness centrality. This measure analyses how close an actor is to other actors within the network. If an actor is close to other actors, it can quickly interact with all the other members of the network. In the communication of information, as these actors are close to all 52. All measures used in this section are those detailed by Wasserman & Faust, 1994 . These measures are built into the application, SocNetV, available from D. B. Kalamaras (2009), http://socnetv.sourceforge.net, accessed February 2009, which has been used to provide the results and visualizations in this paper. the other actors, they do not rely on others to convey information on their behalf. Therefore, this measure can be used to assess an actor's independence in the network as they are able to avoid the potential for control by other actors. The actor closeness centrality (ACC) calculates the invert sum of the distances of an actor from all other actors within the network. An ACC value falls between zero, as would be indicated by a circular network visualization, and one, where an actor has geodesics of length 1 to all other actors of the network and all the other actors have geodesics of length 2 to the other actors (i.e., n -2) of the network, which would be indicated by a star network.
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